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The U.S. accession to the Second World 
War and indisputable victory initiated 
a new stage in the history of the United 
States. The country took a superpower 
position next to the USSR. The USA 
became the leading force of the democratic 
and capitalist world. During the Cold War, 
competing with the Soviet Union for influ‑
ence in the global scale, the United States 
effectively spread its ideology, political 
system model, and value system. A number 
of determinants of an internal nature, both 
objective and subjective, influenced the 
shape of the foreign policy of the USA 
during the Cold War. 
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Abstrakt
Przystąpienie USA do drugiej wojny świa‑
towej i niepodważalne w niej zwycięstwo 
zainicjowało nowy etap w historii Stanów 
Zjednoczonych. Państwo to, które nie 
doznało zniszczeń na własnym terytorium, 
zajęło obok ZSRR pozycję supermocar‑
stwa. W ładzie bipolarnym USA stały 
się wiodącą siłą świata demokratycznego 
i kapitalistycznego. USA zrezygnowały 
z polityki izolacjonizmu na rzecz global‑
nego zaangażowania. W okresie zimnej 
wojny, rywalizując o wpływy z ZSRR 
w każdym regionie świata, Stany Zjedno‑
czone w sposób efektywny szerzyły promo‑
waną przez siebie ideologię, model ustrojo‑
wy oraz system wartości. Taką możliwość 
stworzył Stanom Zjednoczonym szereg 
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Introduction
The nature of the conditions of the U.S. foreign policy during the bipolar 
system is reflected very well in the words of Henry Kissinger, who wrote: 
[…] in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the 
will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international 
system in accordance with its own values. […] In the twentieth century, no coun-
try has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as 
ambivalently as the United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the 
inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more 
passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation 
has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more 
ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions (Kissinger, 2002).
It is therefore indisputable that the decisions to abandon the nineteenth‑cen‑
tury doctrine of the fifth American president James Monroe — the doctrine of 
isolationism and the U.S. entry into the war against the Axis powers, under‑
taken as a result of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, became an impetus 
for strengthening of global Pax Americana in the Cold War period (Michałek, 
1993). This was undoubtedly the most serious challenge to American power, 
forces, means, and the will to engage globally that the U.S. had ever faced. In 
the decades that followed, the USA became a global power whose main goal 
in the period of bipolar rivalry was to defeat the competitive and expansive su‑
perpower of the USSR. After more than 40 years, this goal was fully achieved, 
which enabled America to pursue hegemonic objectives in foreign policy (U.S. 
Role, 2020). The United States owed its power to the dynamic growth of its eco‑
nomic and military potential, but also to the belief that the USA — as Andrzej 
Mania wrote — is a vehicle for values that it should promote (sometimes im- 
determinant o charakterze wewnętrznym, 
zarówno obiektywnym, jak i subiektyw‑
nym, które wpływały na kształt polityki 
zagranicznej poszczególnych amerykań‑
skich administracji w czasach zimnej 
wojny. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest 
zatem dokonanie syntetycznej analizy 
głównych, wewnętrznych uwarunkowań 
polityki zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczo‑
nych w okresie funkcjonowania układu 
bipolarnego.
Słowa kluczowe Stany Zjednoczone, 
zimna wojna, polityka zagraniczna
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pose) for the good of the free world (Mania, 2019). Thus, at the beginning of the 
last decade of the 20th century, the USA gained the position of a hyperpower 
and entered a new stage of unipolar reality (Oezel, 2015) — thereby initiating 
the unilateral period (Krauthammer, 2002), in which the USA itself assumed the 
role of a solitary superpower (Huntington, 1999). 
The aim of this paper is therefore to carry out a synthetic analysis of the 
main internal determinants of the U.S. foreign policy during the bipolar system. 
The paper discusses the major internal, objective and subjective determinants 
of the U.S. foreign policy during the two-block system, which influenced the 
foreign policy of individual American administrations (from the presidency of 
Harry Truman to the two terms of Ronald Reagan). The author attempts to an‑
swer the question what major intra-American determinants made it possible for 
the United States to assume the position of the only superpower at the end of 
the 20th century. Both the doctrinal sphere of different U.S. administrations is 
analyzed, as are the specific actions taken by these administrations, reflected 
in American foreign policy during the Cold War. The paper uses the following 
research methods: historical analysis, content analysis, as well as the compara‑
tive method.
Determinants of foreign policy — theoretical aspects
When analyzing the foreign policy of the United States during the bipolar 
system, it becomes indispensable to present the main terms related to this issue, 
such as foreign policy and its conditions (determinants, markers).
The theory of international relations assumes that foreign policy, which is 
also the internal policy of the state, reflects national interests, raison d’état, 
and the interests of internal social groups (Khara, 2018). There are feedbacks 
between domestic and foreign policy. Foreign policy therefore functions as an 
integral, albeit specific, part of state’s policy (Horowitz, 1977). On the other 
hand, the implementation of a foreign policy depends on two groups of fac‑
tors: the reaction of a polyarchic international environment and the potential of 
a given state. Drawing upon leading Polish researchers of international relations, 
it should be pointed out, following Teresa Łoś-Nowak, that foreign policy is 
a “dynamic process of formulating and implementing national interests in a pol‑
yarchal and polycentric international environment (Łoś-Nowak, 2000)”. Accord‑
ing to Erhard Cziomer: 
[…] foreign policy is the process of formulating and implementing national-
state interests in relation to other states and participants of the international 
system (Cziomer, 2001). 
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Ryszard Zięba, on the other hand, wrote that 
[…] foreign policy is a public purposeful activity of the state directed at the 
international environment (Zięba, 2004). 
In turn, Roman Kuźniar emphasized that 
the state’s foreign policy should be understood as an organized and outward 
effort of the state, subordinated to the achievement of its vital interests, which 
is expressed in shaping its external environment (in creating and favoring re-
lations and favorable situations, preventing and removing unfavorable). (Kuź-
niar, 2001). 
It is also hard to disagree with Jacek Ziemowit Pietras, who stressed that the 
symbols of foreign policy for centuries were: a diplomat who was mildly con‑
vincing about his arguments and a general who was preparing the army to force 
concessions (Ziemowit-Pietraś, 1997).
A state’s foreign policy is determined by a set of driving forces that initi‑
ate its operation at the international level. These forces, which are elements of 
the foreign policy environment, are synonymously referred to as: factors, mark‑
ers, conditions, premises, determinants, stimulants, driving forces, incentives, 
or impulses to act or omissions in the international arena. In line with one of the 
definitions adopted in the theory of international relations, the notion of indica‑
tors of a state’s foreign policy is understood as a system of mutually depend‑
ent conditions that cause a specific effect and are sufficient for a given effect 
to occur. However, the determinants of foreign policy are changeable and al‑
ways closely correlated with each other. The literature provides various detailed 
classifications of this conceptual category, although a kind of conceptual con‑
sensus emerges about their general division into four main groups: 1) objective 
determinants — existing regardless of the state of activity and value judgement 
of policy makers; 2) subjective determinants — dependent on the activities of 
decision-makers, reflecting their assessments and preferences; 3) internal deter‑
minants — taking into account and reflecting the intra-state interests in relation 
to the international environment, especially the raison d’état, as well as spe‑
cific factors, interests and internal conditions of the state; 4) external (interna‑
tional) determinants — reflecting the influence of the international environment 
on a state’s foreign policy However, objective and subjective determinants have 
both the internal and external aspect (Zięba, 2004). Internal conditions take pri‑
ority over external ones, and objective ones over subjective ones.
Therefore, referring in a very synthetic way to those four groups of deter‑
minants of a state’s foreign policy, it should be emphasized that internal objec‑
tive determinants relate primarily to: the geopolitical environment of the state 
(location, topography, climate, natural resources); its demographic potential 
(population number, age structure, population density, population growth rate, 
scale of migration, national composition); economic potential (GDP, currency 
strength, degree of economic ties with other countries); scientific and techni‑
cal progress; the military strength of the state; the socio-political system (the 
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administrative division of the country, the rights and obligations of citizens, the 
functioning of the media and public opinion, the influence of political elites 
and pressure groups, party system, social and professional structure). In turn, 
subjective internal determinants include: perception of the international envi‑
ronment (perception by both the establishment and society of a given country 
of other participants in international relations; culture and historical tradition of 
a given country; ideologies, religions, political views, belief systems and politi‑
cal consciousness as well as formulating a vision and strategy of foreign policy 
(the degree of social support and the possibility of consensus among politicians 
are important); the role of outstanding individuals (the degree of authority and 
the scope of their power); quality of the foreign service. On the other hand, the 
objective external determinants are: the evolution of the external environment 
(integration and globalization processes (Khara, 2018), the breakdown of states 
or the collapse of systems); the position of the state in the system of international 
relations and roles (depending on whether the state’s position is central, key or 
peripheral, whether it is a power, a medium‑sized state, a small state or a mini‑
state); the nature of international legal agreements and obligations (including 
the degree of compliance with international law); participation in alliances, in‑
ternational organizations and obligations under the concluded bi- and multilat‑
eral agreements). The group of subjective external determinants includes: the 
international perception of a given state; concepts of foreign policy and military 
doctrines of other countries; diplomatic activity (declared and actual) of other 
participants in international relations (Cziomer, 2001). 
The main determinants of U.S. foreign policy during  
the Cold War of an objective nature
After the Second World War, the United States and the USSR shaped a new 
international order known as bipolar (Ball, 1998). In the new order, these two 
superpowers effectively spread (imposed) socio-political and economic ideolo‑
gies within their own spheres of influence, and competed at international level 
and in international space. A number of internal and external American condi‑
tions allowed the USA to take over the role of the leader of the democratic, 
capitalist world.
An analysis of the objective intra-American conditions should focus on the 
natural determinants that enabled the USA to assume the role of a superpower. 
Both the territorial size of the United States (9,373,000 km²) was important, 
which made it possible to place the USA in the fourth place among the largest 
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countries in the world in terms of territoriality, after the USSR, Canada and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Michałek, 2004), as well as the favorable 
geopolitical location of the USA — separation by the Pacific Ocean from Asia 
and the Atlantic Ocean from Europe, as well as sharing the border with just two 
countries (Canada to the north and Mexico to the south). For several centuries, 
this state of affairs predestined the United States to become one of the countries 
least endangered by external attacks in the world (German, 2002). 
No less important was the evolving demographic structure of American so‑
ciety (Michałek, 2004). Comparing the data from the interwar period and the 
post‑war period, a marked increase in the number of the U.S. residents should 
be noted, which is referred to as the demographic revolution. At the end of the 
1940s, the demographic potential of the USA was only 7% of the global popula‑
tion (Zyblikiewicz, 2004), but in the second half of that decade there was a sig‑
nificant increase in the birth rate known as the American Baby Boom. The con‑
stant growth of the American population allowed the USA to be ranked fourth 
among the most populated countries in the world during the Cold War, after the 
PRC, India and the USSR (Cole, 1968). 
Changes in the U.S. population during the Cold War
Sou rce: Own study based on M.A. Jones, Historia USA, Gdańsk 2002, pp. 663—665.
In this respect, it should be added that migration processes played an impor‑
tant role in the evolution of the demographic structure of American society. Be‑
tween 1940 and 1980, 11 million immigrants came to the United States, mostly 
from Central and Eastern Europe, Cuba, Mexico, and Canada (Growth, 2020). 
Most importantly, after the Second World War, the USA also played a domi‑
nant role in the economic field. This state of affairs allowed the United States 
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to conduct an effective global policy, to consolidate hegemony within its own 
area of influence, and to effectively compete in the arms race with the USSR 
(Kiwerska, 1999). As the Second World War ended, the United States emerged 
as an economic power, capable of commencing economic expansion into other 
third country markets (Higgs, 1994). Constantly increasing economic strength 
allowed the USA to take over the position that before the Second World War 
belonged to two European colonial powers — the United Kingdom and France 
(Pastusiak, 2005). The economic Pax Americana, shaped in the first years after 
the Second World War, was being perpetuated in the following decades in an 
effective manner. The USA took over the position of a creditor and main lender 
on a global scale (Bógdoł-Brzezińska, 2001). Although, in the second half of the 
1940s, the United Kingdom, China and France were indicated as strategic part‑
ners of the USA in the economic field, which was supposed to reflect the concept 
of the “four policemen,” but these predictions turned out to be premature. The 
USA made European partners dependent on itself by initiating the Truman doc‑
trine, the Marshall Plan, or the establishment of the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (Lafeber, 1967). Furthermore, the USA became 
the guarantor of the stability of the currency system of most countries, which 
was reflected in the Breton Woods conference (July 1-22, 1944) at which it was 
decided that the U.S. dollar convertible into gold (in the proportion of USD35 per 
ounce of gold) would be the basis for calculating foreign exchange rates (Gaddis, 
1997). In the second half of the 1940s, American banks held approximately 70% 
of all gold reserves in western countries. An expression of the ever-increasing 
American hegemony in the economic field was also the establishment of such 
organizations as: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), in which the United States, due to the financial contribution, had 
the deciding vote (Domagała, 2004). After the Second World War, American in‑
vestors had the potential of about ¾ of the capital of other countries(McCauley, 
2008). The U.S. share in world production alone was estimated at 41.4% in 1937, 
and in the first year after the war, it was 62% (Łastawski, 2004). Large corpora‑
tions started to dominate in the USA, their domain was industrial production, 
there was an automotive boom (Chevrolet, Ford), the production of energy car‑
riers and the service sector increased. The USA produced 57% of steel, 43% of 
electricity, 62% of oil, and 80% of cars globally. While the share of the USA in 
the exports of capitalist states before the war had been only 14.2%, in the post-
war period (in 1947) it already accounted for about ⅓ of exports of the entire 
capitalist world (32.5%).
Pointing to the endogenous objective determinants of the U.S. foreign policy 
during the Cold War, attention should also be paid to the constantly growing 
military power of the United States as well as the breakthrough scientific and 
technical advancement taking place in this country (Omitoogun, Sköns, 2007). 
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This was possible due to the continuous increase in federal expenditure on na‑
tional defense. 
U.S. Cold War armaments expenditure in USD billions 
Sou rce: Own study based on L. Zyblikiewicz, USA…,p. 223, p. 241; S. Perlo-Freemen, 65 years of 
military spending: Trends in SIPRI’s new data, SIPRI, 21 November 2016, https://www.sipri.org/com
mentary/blog/2016/65-years-military-spending (20.10.2020).
During the bipolar system, the American decision-makers also prioritized 
the development of the modern arms industry, including aviation and the navy. 
The foundation of the American military might was, on the one hand, the pos‑
session of nuclear weapons (“atomic diplomacy”), and on the other, the ability 
to move U.S. troops at maximum speed and with all equipment (Jaskuła, 2014). 
An extremely important element of the emerging military domination was the 
attempt to guarantee the presence of American forces in the strategic parts of 
the globe, which was to be served by the systematically expanded network of 
military bases. They served three basic functions: 1) military (they allowed the 
USA to keep its military forces in the territory of other countries, as close to 
the USSR as possible, thus creating the possibility of an attack on enemy ter‑
ritory, also during time of peace); 2) political (they made it possible to support 
anti-communist authorities in the countries where they were deployed); 3) eco‑
nomic (they allowed, on the one hand, to maintain good economic situation in 
the USA, and on the other, to link these countries and make them dependent 
on Washington) (Ohtomo, 2012). Before the war, the United States maintained 
bases on the American continent mainly, while abroad they were only in the 
Philippines, at the Guantanamo base in Cuba, and in the Panama Canal zone. 
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In mid-1946, about 1.2 million U.S. soldiers were abroad, and in the early 1980s 
the figure was 549,400, which was 25% of all U.S. forces. The USA had over 
1,500 bases (land, sea and air) as well as military installations and devices on 
the territory of 32 countries. At the beginning of 1969, the number of American 
bases was 2,400, of which about 700 were considered large (Herrera, Cicchini, 
2013). In the 1960s, military bases were deployed in around 30 countries around 
the world. Until the outbreak of the Vietnam War, the USA attention was fo‑
cused mainly on the European continent, with the Federal Republic of Germany 
constituting the main area of location for the U.S. armed forces (188 bases). An 
important role was also played by the military bases located in the Mediterra‑
nean region, bases in Greece and Turkey in particular, as well as bases in the 
Far East: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The U.S. naval forces then 
numbered: aircraft carriers — 15, aircraft — 1,778, submarines — 86, support 
and security vessels — 237.
During the James Carter administration, the American Intervention Force — 
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was established. On January 1, 1983, they were 
subordinated to the newly created the U.S. Central Command, which was re‑
sponsible for preparing troops to conduct combat operations on the territory of 
19 African and Asian countries, especially in the Middle East, including the 
Persian Gulf sub-region, as well as Europe and Latin America (Cooley, 1991).
The USA power during the Cold War was also determined by advancements 
in the field of science and technology, including space exploration. The United 
States was a forerunner and promoter of new technologies, the home of the com‑
munication, rocket, transport, television, computer revolution and finally also 
the minicomputer revolution (Michałek, 2004).1 
When analyzing the internal determinants of an objective nature of Ameri‑
can foreign policy, one cannot ignore the socio-political and party system in 
the USA, political elites, the functioning of pressure groups and lobbies, or the 
enormous and constantly growing role of the mass media.
On the one hand, the U.S. Constitution does not provide expressis verbis 
who is responsible for conducting foreign policy, but on the other, in line with 
the checks and balance principle, specific for the U.S. political system, powers in 
the area of foreign policy have been divided between the president and Congress. 
The cooperation between the legislature and the executive power concerns, inter 
1 On May 5, 1961, the first American, Alan B. Shepard, flew into space on the “Freedom” 
spacecraft, which initiated a series of flights under the “Mercury,” “Gemini,” and “Apollo” 
programs, which ended on July 20, 1969 with the first landing on the moon of two crew mem‑
bers the Apollo 11 spacecraft — Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin. Scientific and technical 
progress meant the development of the automotive and aviation industries. The launch of the 
first American four-engine jet — the Boeing 707, which was also used as the Air Force One 
presidential plane, was a major breakthrough. In 1963, the communication satellites Telstar 1 
and Telstar 2 were launched into orbit. In 1953, the first credit card (Diner’s Club card) was 
also introduced.
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alia, the use of the military abroad, the declaration of a state of emergency, the 
conclusion of international treaties and agreements, or the nomination process 
(Konstytucja, 2002). The U.S. president retains the initiative in formulating the 
foreign policy strategy, but Congress may take advantage of the opportunity to 
correct or block it. In practice, during the two world wars, the Korean War or 
the Indochina War, the initiative in international affairs belonged mainly to the 
President of the USA. Those were the so-called “imperial presidencies” of John 
F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon (Bowles, 1998). It was not 
until the 1970s that the U.S. Congress became more active in the field of for‑
eign policy (Berezowski, 2001), and its role in shaping foreign relations began 
to increase. During the Cold War, an important role in shaping U.S. foreign 
policy was also played by the lobby and pressure groups, which, using primarily 
a financial instrument, exerted influence over political decision-makers in order 
to implement their own interests. Almost every major professional, religious, 
ethnic, corporation, trade or industrial association had its own lobbyists. It has 
been estimated that there were approximately 7,000 lobbying firms in Washing‑
ton during the Cold War (Davidson, Oleszek, 1994). In particular, the Jewish, 
Greek and Armenian lobbies stood out as the best organized and most effective 
(Bowles, 1998). 
Therefore, to close the objective analysis of the intra-American determinants 
of foreign policy, a reference should also be made to the functioning of the 
media and public opinion in the USA, which is called the fourth power in the 
country, and with reason (Hofman, 2009). It was after the Second World War 
that the influence of the former group became most visible in relations between 
society and politics. For it is the mass media that, for example: first created, 
and then destroyed Senator McCarthy; promoted the ideal John F. Kennedy, and 
after his death they created the myth of a great political personality; compro‑
mised and helped to remove Richard Nixon from power (Watergate) (Kutler, 
1994); made the public to withhold their assent to the Vietnam War; portrayed 
President Gerald Ford as a heavy-handed and incompetent politician; created the 
ever-smiling James Carter, then destroyed that image by showing a picture of 
the president fainting while jogging; promoted actor by profession Ronald Rea‑
gan; or during the Second Gulf War, manifested uncritical support for President 
George H. Bush (Skurowski, 1997). American media, in line with the principle 
of freedom of speech and the media, which is an overriding precept in the USA, 
for their own use and in accordance with their own political convictions, without 
any objections or compromise created images of strong and weak politicians, 
and bearing in mind the extremely difficult time of the Cold War, potential mili‑
tary conflict with the USSR and necessity to defeat the communist enemy, con‑
stantly built the image of a seemingly united American political scene and the 
monolithic American society centered around traditional American symbols and 
the omnipresent sense of patriotism.
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The main determinants of US foreign policy  
during the Cold War of a subjective nature
The shape of the United States’ foreign policy during the bipolar order was 
significantly influenced by the internal conditions of a subjective nature. The 
determinants that enabled the USA to maintain its position as a superpower dur‑
ing the Cold War were the perception of the evolving international environment 
and the adaptation of the foreign policy to the changing conditions, the influence 
of ideology, religion, political awareness, and the role of charismatic individuals. 
Those factors further exerted their influence after the U.S. victory in the Cold 
War rivalry.
When analyzing the determinants outlined above, it should be emphasized 
that during the Cold War period, one of the most important determinants of 
the U.S. foreign policy was the area of framing foreign policy strategies. This 
was all the more important that the American foreign policy almost from the 
moment of the state constitution was characterized by a dilemma based on the 
answer to the question which direction would bring more benefits to the United 
States, isolationism or involvement? (Kiwerska, 1995)2 In the period of rivalry 
with the USSR, the choice of the option of getting involved and defending the 
Western world against the expansion of communism seemed obvious.
During the bipolar order, there was a social consensus in the United States 
regarding the goals and main course of foreign policy. Supporters of various 
political options focused essentially around two pillars, which were to counter 
and deter the USSR (Mania, 2019). Only in the second half of the 1960s, there 
was a significant revaluation in this matter. The reasons for the changes should 
be sought in the political and psychological prerequisites of the Vietnam War, 
the post-Vietnamese syndrome, the changes taking place in the American es‑
tablishment caused, among others, by the Watergate scandal, the CIA and FBI 
scandals, and the emerging slogans of moral renewal in political life. Thus, in 
the first half of the 1970s, different positions on the way of conducting Ameri‑
can foreign policy were developed. They were characterized, on the one hand, 
by caution and skepticism as regards the USA taking on military obligations 
abroad, and on the other, by placing the emphasis on competing with the USSR, 
with the possibility of cooperating with it in selected areas.
The USA, emerging from the Second World War as the undisputed military, 
political and economic power, made a fundamental shift in the foreign policy. 
2 In 1911, Alfred Mahan formulated the idea of American expansionism — mastering 
water spaces and becoming the first power in the world. A few years later, General William 
Mitchell assigned crucial importance to the US Air Force. Based on these two theories in the 
1960s, the global strategy of the United States was shaped, the aim of which was to remove 
the threat of war from the territory of the USA.
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Concerns about a return to the policy of isolationism that surfaced in the mid-
1940s turned out to be unfounded. After the Second World War, luminaries such 
as George Marshall, Averell Harriman, Dean Acheson, James Forrestal, John 
Foster Dulles, George Kennan and Dean Rusk took steps to promote the global 
involvement of the United States (Zyblikiewicz, 2004). The break‑up of coop‑
eration within the Great Coalition during the Second World War and rivalry 
with the USSR therefore implied the emergence of a new, global U.S. doctrine, 
known as the containment doctrine, which set the course of American foreign 
policy in the years 1947—1952. Its creator, George F. Kennan, the then coun‑
selor of the U.S. embassy in Moscow, wanted the USA and Western European 
countries to create an effective barrier against the spread of communist ideology 
in the world, thus forcing the socialist bloc to make political concessions. Ac‑
cording to the doctrine, the USA was to become involved wherever there was 
a threat of a victory for communism. The containment doctrine was supposed 
to bring about a balance of power between superpowers on a global scale. The 
United States was to focus on Western Europe as the most likely battle front. 
The leading instruments for implementing the doctrine in practice were: the 
Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the rise of West Germany and NATO, as 
well as the formation of numerous military alliances (McCauley, 2008). The 
implementation of the containment doctrine meant a definite departure from the 
assumptions of isolationism, marking new levels of global involvement of the 
United States.
In 1952, the U.S. presidential election was won for the first time in twenty 
years by Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower, who, by criticizing the con‑
tainment doctrine as too soft, gained broad support from the American public. 
The new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, who was the architect of the lib‑
eration doctrine, implemented its principles. The doctrine was based on the as‑
sumption that the USA as a superpower should lead to the liberation of the world 
from the ideology of communism. Dulles called for the formation of a strong 
coalition of Western democracies capable of resisting the expansion of the USSR 
(LaFaber, 1967). Any conflict on the East-West line could be resolved by the 
USA using all possible means, balancing on the brink of war. According to the 
assumptions of the liberation doctrine, it was only after the strengthening of 
Western Europe that the negotiations with the USSR on détente had a chance of 
success. Western Europe and maintaining strong ties with Germany remained 
the priority and the basis of the U.S. global security policy (Ambrose, 1993).3 In
3 President Dwight Eisenhower was in favor of accelerating the process of Germany’s 
remilitarization within NATO, as well as he strived to limit communist influence in the so-
called then the Third World, as exemplified by the CIA intervention in Iran in 1953; actions 
against the government of Arbenzov in Guatemala in 1954; or the attempt to overthrow Fidel 
Castro in Cuba in 1961. In the case of Indochina, Eisenhower advocated the consolidation of 
non-communist forces in the region and the withdrawal of France, thus avoiding direct US 
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1954, the foundations of the liberation doctrine were modified as part of the roll 
back doctrine — pushing back Soviet influence from Eastern Europe. It was as‑
sumed that communism should be pushed to the borders of the USSR. In 1957, 
both concepts collapsed, which was due to: the Suez crisis of 1956; uprising in 
Hungary in 1956; the USSR launch of the first Sputnik into space in October 
1957; the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, and the related policy of détente in 
theUSA—USSR relations (Malendowski, 1994).
The successor of President Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy from the 
Democratic Party, still as a candidate for the U.S. presidency, described his po‑
litical program as “New Frontier,” referring to the legacy of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt (Zyblikiewicz, 2004). He declared to strengthen the position and pres‑
tige of the USA in the international arena (Kissinger, 2002). The goal of his 
administration, like that of his predecessors, was to eliminate communism, but 
the measures leading to this were to be of a peaceful nature (Pastusiak, 2005). 
Following the April 1961 incident in the Bay of Pigs, and subsequent Cuban 
quarantine, the USA recognized the principle of the balance of power in inter‑
national relations. John F. Kennedy sought to win over anti-American countries, 
then so-called the Third World, and therefore in 1961 proposed the “Alliance 
for Progress” — a program of economic and social development in Latin Amer‑
ica. Kennedy also established the “Peace Corps” — an organization to train 
local staff and send volunteers to developing countries. These actions were 
aimed at stopping the infiltration of the USSR in the so-called Third World 
(Bartlett, 1997). 
Importantly, Kennedy’s successor, President Lyndon Johnson in dealing with 
the Eastern Bloc continued the political line of his predecessor to a large extent 
(Brzeziński, 1966).4 Both Kennedy’s and Johnson’s strategies were characterized 
by dualism — a tendency to seek a rapprochement with Moscow while pursuing 
a policy of force and containment of the USSR (Bankowicz, 2004). The Johnson 
doctrine, announced on May 2, 1965, predestined the USA to the role of the 
world’s policeman. It indicated that the USA would not allow the communists 
to seize power in any of the countries of the Western Hemisphere (Dobrzycki, 
2000).5 As emphasized, the USA had the right to intervene wherever its interests 
were at stake. The foreign policy of the Lyndon Johnson administration was 
therefore dominated by the ongoing problem of American involvement in the 
Vietnam War, the consequences of which were felt in the USA in many areas 
over the next decades.
involvement in the war in Indochina. He saw the best security for U.S. interests in Southeast 
Asia in the creation of SEATO.
4 Lyndon Johnson, like John F. Kennedy, promoted the concept of building bridges in 
relations with the Eastern Bloc.
5 1965, U.S. troops intervened in the Dominican Republic.
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The unresolved problem of the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia became 
the main challenge of the next Richard Nixon administration. Henry Kissinger’s 
and Melvin Baird’s strategy of war “Vietnamization,” namely conducting peace 
negotiations and replacing American troops with South Vietnamese forces, 
became a leading element of the Nixon doctrine announced on the island of 
Guam on July 25, 1969. The USA was to remain a global power, whose nu‑
clear potential, naval and aviation forces were to guarantee the security of Japan 
and Southeast Asia, but land defense should have remained the competence of 
the countries in the region (Kiwerska, 1999).6 As it was emphasized, the USA 
should become involved only where its national interests were directly threat‑
ened, giving up the role of a global policeman. The conviction that American 
power is limitless has been replaced by the awareness of its limitations. In rela‑
tions with the USSR, pragmatism won over American messianism. The admin‑
istration of Richard Nixon, and then Gerald Ford, recognized the ineffectiveness 
of conducting politics from a position of strength in the evolving international 
environment. Proposals to replace the era of confrontation with the era of ne‑
gotiations, with the idea of partnership, disarmament and peaceful coexistence 
have become dominant.
The concept of the foreign policy of the next U.S. president, James Carter, 
can be described as a departure from the global doctrine. However, the im‑
plemented strategy turned out to be a set of not fully compatible assumptions, 
among which five prevailed: strengthening the political and economic cohesion 
of the countries of the Western bloc (Tripartite Commission, trilateralism); pro‑
moting constructive cooperation with developed countries (especially with influ‑
ential countries such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia, India, and Nigeria); continuing the 
dialogue and increased diplomatic, economic and military activity to resolve the 
Middle East conflict — promoting the success of the agreement between Egypt 
and Israel concluded at Camp David in 1978, and normalizing the situation in 
Iran as a result of the Islamic revolution (Korany, 1992) — the overthrow of 
the pro-American Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the hostage crisis (Tousi, 
1997); protection of U.S. strategic interests, with particular focus on the South‑
east Asia region; continuing the process of arms control and détente (Holzer, 
2000). For the administration of President Carter, the protection of human rights 
and the related restoration of the moral authority of the USA in the world, which 
was seriously undermined as a result of the Watergate and Iran-Contras scandals 
(Cordesman, 1987) and the long-term implications of involvement in the Viet‑
nam War were of particular importance. 
6 The withdrawal of 550 thousand American soldiers from Vietnam started in June 1969. 
On January 27, 1973, a peace treaty was signed providing for the withdrawal of U.S. troops 
from Vietnam. The Vietnam War cost the USA USD 165 billion. The main goal of stopping 
communism in Asia was not achieved, though.
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James Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, took the office as President of the 
United States during a period of increasing tensions between the superpowers. 
In 1979, the era of détente ended, which was decisively influenced by the double 
missile decision and the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan (Halliday, 2005). Ro‑
nald Reagan devoted his first term of office to the confrontation with the USSR 
and the second term to disarmament negotiations, which resulted in the disin‑
tegration of both the Eastern Bloc and the collapse of the USSR (Hanhimäki, 
Westad, 2003).7 Ronald Reagan was of the opinion that the USA, as a result of 
the Vietnam War and the loss of one of the most important allies in the Middle 
East (Tarock, 1998) — Iran (the failure of the twin pillar policy), was weakened 
as the world leader and thus the U.S. power and hegemony needed to be rebuilt 
(Nowik, 1985). The foundation of Reagan’s doctrine was the Pentagon’s con‑
cept of U.S. military involvement in conflicts in then so-called the Third World, 
which were referred to as low-intensity conflicts. The doctrine envisaged three 
forms of U.S. military involvement abroad: helping to counter uprisings against 
conservative leaders; support for anti-government forces in progressive coun‑
tries (Leczowski, 1990); active defense against terrorism. In the late 1980s, how‑
ever, the Reagan administration began to perceive the international system in 
terms of change which overlapped with a number of external conditions shaping 
the international arena. The following have become dominant in this matter: the 
energy crisis (Stivers, 1986); the Arab oil embargo of 1973—1974 (Kokxhorn, 
1976); détente processes; disintegration of the two-block system; downplaying 
American and Soviet hegemony in their own spheres of influence; the USA de‑
feat in Vietnam; failure of the USSR in Afghanistan; postulates of a new eco‑
nomic order; the emergence of a pentagonal world, and the emerging theories 
about imminent decline of U.S. power and about building a polycentric world.
To sum up the subject of American administrations’ strategies during the 
Cold War, the words of Samuel P. Huntington seem to be the most appropriate, 
as he pointed that the United States is a vast country with an array of civiliza‑
tional and cultural factors which should be accounted for while building Ameri‑
can military strategy (Huntington, 1986). 
Therefore, when analyzing the intra-American determinants of foreign poli‑
cy, attention should also be paid to military doctrines, the basic axiom of which, 
unchanged over time, was the desire to exclude the U.S. territory from the reach 
of possible military operations.
7 In the 1980s, the strategy of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy underwent a major revalu‑
ation. Starting with the perception of the USSR in terms of an “evil empire,” permanent 
increase in defense spending, expansion of the armaments program, providing aid to anti-
communist movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, the inva‑
sion of Grenada in October 1983 (intended to limit the influence of the USSR and Cuba 
in the Caribbean region), up to the period of perestroika and the agreements with Mikhail 
Gorbachev.
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In 1954, the first post-war American military doctrine, known as the “shield 
and sword,” was officially proclaimed. It was based on the assumption that the 
USA should have a decisive advantage over the USSR in terms of both nuclear 
weapons stocks and their means of delivery. As indicated, any armed conflict 
between the USA and the Warsaw Pact states could automatically turn into 
a global nuclear war. The situation in which the U.S. territory became directly 
open to attack triggered a shift in thinking among the American political elite. 
The new military and political reality led to the modification and creation of the 
doctrine of flexible response in 1962. Its assumptions were dominated by the 
conviction that three types of war could be waged: universal — with unlimited 
use of nuclear weapons; limited — mainly conventional, with the possibility 
of using nuclear weapons in Europe as well; special — psychological, uncon‑
ventional and counterinsurgency operations. The second option was assigned 
the highest rank as well as the greatest probability. Thus, it was assumed that 
the NATO member states could be the first to use nuclear weapons (Kissinger, 
2002). Importantly, at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of extended 
deterrence was introduced into American military doctrine, which indicated 
the threat of using nuclear weapons against the unacceptable by the USA, non- 
nuclear actions of a potential enemy. The conditio sine qua non of attaining this 
goal was defined as gaining the U.S. military advantage over the USSR. The 
concept of one war plus also emerged, which was the opposite of the concept 
of war and a half. One war plus assumed that the U.S. armed forces should be 
prepared to wage two kinds of war, one intensive but short war in Europe (about 
30 days), which would result in a U.S. victory or turn into a nuclear conflict, and 
the other one, in another area that is vital to U.S. interests. Due to the constantly 
growing dependence of Western countries on oil from the Middle East region, 
military decision-makers in the USA assumed that the most likely place of an 
East-West confrontation would be this part of the globe, especially the Persian 
Gulf sub-region. The last of the U.S. Cold War military doctrines, based on the 
concept of horizontal escalation promoted by the Ronald Reagan administration, 
assumed that a potential threat to U.S. security should be sought with the same 
probability in Europe as in other parts of the globe, especially in the Persian 
Gulf or the Far East. This doctrine was based on the following premises: rejec‑
tion of détente as the basis of the world order; the growing importance of power 
as a factor in the implementation of foreign policy; expansion of ideological and 
moral motivations in justifying foreign and military policy; the use of scientific 
and technical progress to ensure the U.S. military advantage over the USSR and 
the Warsaw Pact; subordinating the dialogue with the USSR to efforts to regain 
the position of the only superpower (Reich, 1980). Under the military doctrine 
adopted by the Ronald Reagan administration, the number of theaters of war 
could not be precisely quantified. The defense platform was to be the U.S. armed 
forces prepared to wage a long conventional war, on the scale of the Korean War 
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and even the Second World War. The use of nuclear weapons was not excluded 
during its course. It was emphasized that the USA would not hesitate to use this 
type of weapon as the first party (Hubel, 1995).
When introducing the essence of subjective intra-American determinants, it 
is also worth pointing to the changing model of American society and the domi‑
nant systems of beliefs and values. Kenneth Dexter Miller wrote: 
We love our land. We love its scenic beauties, its gleaming cities, its broad 
highways, its gigantic factories and mills, its towering office buildings, its spa-
cious farms and plantations. We love our home, be it farmhouse or palatial 
mansion, city flat or suburban villa. But what makes America America to us are 
its people (Miller, 1943). 
Importantly, then, there were no deep ideological conflicts in American soci‑
ety during the Cold War. Across divisions, there was agreement on the core val‑
ues that were widely accepted and deeply entrenched among Americans. Since 
the inception of the United States as a state, civil religion, understood as a fu‑
sion of religion and patriotism (Williams, 2013), has become dominant, which 
allows for building a conviction in the uniqueness, mission and a kind of mes‑
sianism of the United States in the world (McKay, 1994).
As Tadeusz Żyro noted: 
“Civil religion” creates a set of images specific for the United States, aimed 
at embedding national symbols into the collective imagination. […] The arsenal 
of means which enable influencing social mindset includes three great sets of 
collective imaginations: utopia, ideology, and myth (Żyro, 2002). 
Interestingly, during the Cold War, American political conservatism stood 
above divisions. This state of affairs was reflected in the conducted foreign poli‑
cy, which reached ideological consensus. Virtually until the 1980s, there was no 
such a thing as a strictly conservative or liberal foreign policy. This was not the 
subject of a dispute between conservatives and liberals who were traditionally 
linked by anti-communism, and the position that détente should not be the main 
determinant of the USA attitude towards the USSR. Thus, messianism and the 
historical mission of the USA during the Cold War was understood primarily as 
defending the world against the expansion of communist ideology and support‑
ing free nations, the values offered by the democratic system, and the broadly 
understood protection of human rights. This was one of the main, albeit idealis‑
tic, determinants of the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
Coming to an end of the analysis of the subjective determinants of American 
foreign policy, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the optimistic 
idea of the American Dream, which was revived since the 1960s — the belief 
in prosperity and the possibility of achieving it through hard work — the myth 
of America as the Promised Land. As a consequence, the American Dream be‑
came the spiritus movens of, on the one hand, the development of the civil rights 
movement in American society (the actions of Martin Luther King), the birth 
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of the feminist movement, and on the other, an inspiration for the expansion of 
conformist behavior, the sexual revolution, the disappearance of elites and value 
systems, finally the emergence of mass society and the domination of mass cul‑
ture, which over time belittled the ideals previously guiding American society.
Conclusions
The Second World War was the greatest challenge for the United States to 
its own might, forces, means and will to engage globally and abandon the doc‑
trine of the fifth American president James Monroe — the isolationism. From 
the Second World War, the United States emerged as a superpower capable of 
expansion and imposing its own political and economic solutions in all regions 
of the world. The USA has become dominant on four leading levels: political, 
economic, military, and cultural. A number of intra-American conditions, in‑
cluding a favorable geopolitical location, high position in terms of the size of the 
territory and population, rapid scientific and technical progress, encompassing 
the military field and the arms race in space, as well as the consensus of politi‑
cal elites in the matter of foreign policy and the fact that the greatest threat to 
the U.S. security remains the USSR and the possibility of spreading communist 
ideology, enabled the United States to effectively compete with the other super‑
power in a bipolar system.
Therefore, the Cold War shaped the foreign policy of the United States, in‑
fluenced the attitudes of American society, consolidated patriotic values, raised 
the rank of civil religion, but also more broadly — shaped a new international 
order. The USA undoubtedly won the confrontation with the expansive super‑
power of the USSR, and at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century 
it remained the only superpower and invincible hegemon capable of domination 
on a global scale. Thus, the dissolution of the USSR and the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc meant that the enemy that had shaped American foreign policy 
for several decades disappeared, but its spirit remained. The U.S. victory in the 
Cold War competition did not therefore mean an unconditional victory. The new 
international order that was taking shape at the turn of the 20th and 21st cen‑
turies brought many new challenges and threats to American political decision-
makers. First of all, new rival powers have emerged, among which China has 
become the most competitive (especially in the economic field). As it turned out 
on September 11, 2001, the visible and yet predictable enemy that was the USSR 
was replaced by an invisible and completely unpredictable one — Islamic terror‑
ism and jihadism, for which the USA and the ongoing cola-colonization of the 
world are the embodiment of all evil.
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